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Population games, stable games, and passivity
Michael J. Fox and Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract—Stable games [1] have the attractive property of
admitting global convergence to equilibria under many learning
dynamics. We show that stable games can be formulated as
passive input-output systems. This observation enables us to
identify passivity of a learning dynamic as a sufﬁcient condition
for global convergence in stable games. Notably, dynamics satis-
fying our condition need not exhibit positive correlation between
the payoffs and their directions of motion. Our condition is
satisﬁed by the dynamics known to exhibit global convergence
in stable games. We give a decision-theoretic interpretation for
passive learning dynamics that mirrors the interpretation of
stable games as strategic environments exhibiting self-defeating
externalities. Lastly, we exploit the ﬂexibility of the passivity
condition to study the impact of applying various forecasting
heuristics to the payoffs used in the learning process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the oldest problems for game theory is the question
of what, if anything, is the correct solution concept. The
stock answer, Nash equilibrium, has well-documented difﬁ-
culties. While existence is generally not an issue so long as
we allow for mixed strategies, uniqueness can rarely be guar-
anteed. A common approach to identifying the “correct” pre-
diction has been to analyze dynamic system models intended
to mimic the decision making processes of the players. This
bottom-up approach is often referred to as evolutionary game
theory, or, learning in games. The procedure entails selecting
an appropriate “evolutionary dynamic” (behavioral rule) and
proceeding to analyze the action trajectories that the game
induces, which often converge to Nash equilibria. The choice
of dynamic is normally based on exogenous considerations.
In particular, the most well-studied dynamic, the replicator
dynamic [2], is inspired by biological evolution. A full
taxonomy of evolutionary dynamics is beyond the scope of
this paper. For a thorough background on evolutionary game
theory, the reader is advised to consult the many monographs
on the subject. In particular, we will mostly follow the
terminology and notation of [3].
Unfortunately, evolutionary game theory frequently fails
to provide much additional clarity because oftentimes the
evolutionary dynamic of interest for a game under study will
not induce any stable ﬁxed points, and may even exhibit
chaos [4]. In fact, games have been constructed that can be
shown to never exhibit stable Nash equilibria under only
very mild conditions on the dynamics themselves [5]. Thus,
from a worst-case perspective, evolutionary game theory
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has fundamental explanatory limitations. Nonetheless, the
situation is often much better. In recent decades, researchers
have sought to identify broad classes of games for which
correspondingly broad classes of dynamics converge to equi-
librium, most notably, potential games [6]. We focus here
on the recently proposed notion of a stable game [1]— a
generalization of a number of earlier ideas including concave
potential games, symmetric normal form games with an
interior ESS, zero sum games and multi zero sum games.
The appealing property of stable games is that their Nash
equilibria comprise a convex set that many dynamics are
guaranteed to reach [1].
In this paper, we show that stable games can be formulated
as passive input-output systems. Passivity is an abstraction
of energy conservation and dissipation in mechanical and
electrical systems [7] that has become a standard tool in the
design and analysis of nonlinear systems [10]. It provides
conditions under which particular system interconnections
will be stable. After we identify stable games as passive
systems, we are guaranteed that play by any admissible
passive learning dynamic will admit globally asymptotically
stable equilibria. It turns out that latter requirement is not
especially restrictive as we show that the dynamics that
guarantee global convergence in stable games are indeed
passive.
An immediate beneﬁt of our characterization, beyond pro-
viding a sufﬁcient condition for stability, is the novel general-
izations it enables. Evolutionary game theory has historically
placed particular emphasis on the study of memoryless, or
“one-shot” games and the dynamical systems induced by
play according to learning dynamics with order equal to
the total number of strategies across all players. While our
deﬁnitions include this setting, they are not restricted to it.
Dynamic learning schemes that utilize additional, auxiliary
states in reckoning strategy changes can also be analyzed
using passivity. In particular, we identify games that preserve
the convergence properties of passive learning dynamics
when they are combined with prevalent forecasting heuristics
like smoothing and trend following
Passivity techniques have been used in the analysis of
game theoretic learning dynamics employed in certain spe-
ciﬁc engineering models [12], [13], but the notion of passiv-
ity capturing a class of dynamics or games is novel as far as
we know.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics
Let P = f1;2;:::;pg be a society comprised of p  1
populations. We think of each population p as a continuumof agents having mass mp. We can informally think of an
individual agent as an inﬁnitesimal in one of the populations.
Each population p has a set of available strategies Sp =
f1;2;:::;npg. The total number of strategies is denoted n = P
p2P np. The set of strategy distributions for population p
is Xp = fxp 2 Rn
p
+ :
P
i2Sp x
p
i = mpg so that for xp 2 Xp
we understand x
p
i 2 R+ as the mass of players in p utilizing
strategy i 2 Sp. The product X =
Q
p2P Xp is the set of
social states.
In this paper we will insist that the population masses
remain constant. This implies that for xp;yp 2 Xp we
have
P
i2Sp(x
p
i   y
p
i ) = 0. Thus admissible changes in
strategy are restricted to the tangent space TXp = fzp 2
Rn
p
:
P
i2Sp z
p
i = 0g. Similarly, changes in social state are
conﬁned to TX =
Q
p2P TXp. We denote the orthogonal
projection onto TX as .
The payoff function F : X ! Rn is a continuous map
associating each social state with a payoff vector so that
F
p
i : X ! R is the payoff to strategy i 2 Sp. We will often
assume X to be ﬁxed and refer to F itself as the game.
A state x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium, denoted x 2 NE(F)
if each strategy in the support of x receives the maximum
payoff available to its population, i.e.
x 2 NE(F) , [x
p
i > 0 ) F
p
i (x)  F
p
j (x)]
8i;j 2 Sp and p 2 P:
We next give a formal deﬁnition of deterministic evolu-
tionary dynamics. Deﬁne sets F and T as follows:
F = fF : X ! Rn : F is Lipschitz continuousg;
T = ffx(t)gt0  X : x() is continuousg:
A deterministic evolutionary dynamic is a set valued map
D : F ! T that assigns each population game F 2 F
a set D(F)  T such that for each  2 X, there is a
trajectory fx(t)gt0 2 D(F) with x(0) = . We will pay
special attention to evolutionary dynamics speciﬁed by the
initial value problem,
_ x = V (x;F(x)) = VF(x);
which we will call traditional learning dynamics.
B. Stable Games
We say that F : X ! Rn is a stable game if
(y   x)0(F(y)   F(x))  0 8x;y 2 X:
For a detailed discussion of stable games, see [1]. Many evo-
lutionary dynamics are quite well-behaved when restricted to
the stable games. The primary intent of this paper is to further
formalize this observation. The above deﬁnition has an
intuitive interpretation when F is continuously differentiable.
Theorem 2.1: [1] Suppose the population game F is C1,
then F is a stable game if and only if DF(x) is negative
semideﬁnite with respect to TX for all x 2 X.
We say that such an F satisﬁes self-defeating externalities.
That is, the payoff improvements to strategies being switched
to are dominated by the payoff improvements to strategies
being abandoned. This is easy to see by letting z = e
p
j e
p
i 2
TX, the difference between two unit vectors, and noting that
(by deﬁnition) z0DF(x)z  0. This implies that
@F
p
j (x)
@z 
@F
p
i (x)
@z , as required.
Many games are known to be stable games. For a thorough
list consult [1] and [14]. We point out only a couple examples
here.
Example 1: Concave potential games Suppose that F :
X ! Rn satisﬁes rf = F for some function f : X ! R.
Then we call F a potential game and f its potential function.
If, in addition, f is concave, then we say that F is a concave
potential game. Concave potential games are stable games,
as can be seen from
(y   x)0 (F(y)   F(x)) = ((y   x))
0 (F(y)   F(x))
= (y   x)0 (F(y)   F(x))
= (y   x)0 (rf(y)   rf(x))
 0;
where the second equality follows from symmetry of the
projection matrix .
Example 2: Congestion games An important subclass of
concave potential games are congestion games with increas-
ing costs. These games model allocation of resources among
selﬁsh users under inelastic demand. Later on we will present
some new results for this speciﬁc class, so we review the
deﬁnitions here. Congestion games were originally proposed
in [15]. The form we study is that described in [18]. We
begin with a ﬁnite set 	 of facilities. For each p 2 P there
is a set Sp of subsets of 	— these are the strategies available
to users in that population. Thus for each facility  2 	 we
deﬁne the utilization level
u(x) =
X
p2P
X
s2Sp
as;xp
s;
where as; is the consumption rate of users of strategy s
with respect to facility . Each facility has a non-decreasing
cost function c : R+ ! R. The payoff function for strategy
s 2 Sp is given by
Fp
s =  
X
2s
as;c(u(x)):
The payoffs can be more compactly represented as
F(x) =  U0C(Ux);
where U 2 Rj	jn is a utilization matrix satisfying (Ux) =
u(x) and
C
0
B
@
u1
. . .
uj	j
1
C
A = diag
 
c1(u1);:::;cj	j(uj	j)

:
It follows that
DF(x) =  U0DC(Ux)U  0; 8x 2 X:
The stable game property of congestion games can also be
demonstrated by showing that congestion games are concavepotential games. We provide this derivation in order to note
that in the case that the cost functions are strictly increasing,
DF(x) is negative deﬁnite for almost all utilization matrices.
However, we note that in some formulations the as; are
assumed to all be equal to one, in which case there are only
ﬁnitely many U and some of them may not be full rank.
We will see that the stable games can be formulated as
passive systems.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We can represent a C1 population game F as an input-
output system,
_ x = u
y = _  = DF(x)u;
which we refer to as the game subsystem induced by F.
Traditionally, we think of games as memoryless mappings
from strategy x to payoff F(x). This alternative description
is for mathematical convenience. We will thus think of games
as mappings from strategy trajectories to payoff trajectories.
Given an initial condition, x0, any admissible, differentiable
trajectory _ x can be “fed” into the game as an input u. By
admissibility we refer to the requirement that
x(t) =
Z t
0
_ x()d + x0 2 X; 8t  0:
The output _  is then just the instantaneous time derivative
of payoff. The actual payoff can be recovered by integrating
and adding in the initial condition:
(t) =
Z t
0
_ ()d + 0:
In order to extend passivity to a system of this form we need
to precisely deﬁne the admissible inputs and similarly deﬁne
passivity relative to those inputs.
A. M-passivity
We will see that stable games and certain learning dynam-
ics exhibit a form of passivity for systems with compact state
spaces. We start with M  Rn and consider the input-output
system
_ z = f(z;u) (1)
y = h(z;u);
where the function f : Rq  Rp ! Rq is locally Lipschitz
(i.e. Lipschitz when restricted to any compact set) and h :
Rq  Rp ! Rp is continuous. Let U = C([0;1);Rp); the
set of continuous functions mapping [0;1) to Rp and deﬁne
an input space
UM(v) , fu 2 U : z0 = v ) z(t) 2 M; 8 t  0g;
where fz(t)gt0 is the solution to the initial value problem
(1) with z(0) = z0 and is assumed to be unique. These are
the inputs that keep the state of the system in M when the
system is initialized at z0 = v. Suppose that UM(v) 6= f;g
for all v 2 M. Let A  M be closed and let Y  M
be a neighborhood of A. Further, suppose that there exists
a continuous function L : Y ! R+ with L 1(0) = A such
that
_ L(z(t))  u(t)0y(t); 8 z(t) 2 Y and 8 u 2 UM(z0): (2)
Then we say that the system is M-passive if  = 1 and
M-anti-passive if  =  1. If the inequality (2) is strict for
z(t) = 2 A then the system is strictly M-passive if  = 1 and
strictly M-anti-passive if  =  1. We will make extensive
use of the following.
Theorem 3.1: Suppose a system is M-passive or M-
anti-passive with storage function L and 0 2 UM(v) for
all v 2 M. Consider solutions to the autonomous system
_ z = f(z;0). If given any bounded set 
  Y there exists
a bounded set  (
) such that z0 2 
 implies z(t) 2  (
)
for all t  0 then L 1(0) is Lyapunov stable. If, in addition
to the above, the system is strictly M-passive or strictly
M-anti-passive then L 1(0) is asymptotically stable, and
globally asymptotically stable if Y = M.
The proof of 3.1 uses standard Lyapunov arguments per-
taining to stability of compact sets, such as those found
in [19]. The existence of the compact set  (
) is nearly
immediate when dealing with traditional game and dynamics
subsystems.
Consider the positive-feedback interconnection of two
systems (f1;h1) and (f2;h2) that are, respectively, M1-
anti-passive with storage function L1 and M2-passive with
storage function L2. More precisely, we deﬁne the inputs to
the two systems as
e1 =  u1 + h2(z2;e2)
e2 = u2 + h1(z1;e1):
We will assume that these equations have unique solutions
for every (z1;z2;u1;u2). This implies an overall state model:
_ x = f(z;u)
y = h(z;u)
where
z =

z1
z2

;u =

u1
u2

; and y =

y1
y2

:
The functions f and h inherit the smoothness properties of
fi and hi.
In order to extend M-passivity to the interconnection in a
meaningful way, we must identify a non-empty set M12 
M1  M2 so that, for the overall system, 0 2 UM12(v) for
all v 2 M12.
Theorem 3.2: The positive-feedback interconnection of
two systems that are, respectively, M1-passive with storage
function L1 and M2-passive with storage function L2, is
M12-passive with storage function L12(z1;z2) = L1(z1) +
L2(z2).
The proof is nearly identical to that of the classical
passivity theorem. Theorem 3.1 can then be used to estab-
lish stability properties, the key point being recognition of
L12(z1;z2) as the appropriate Lyapunov function. The next
section illustrates how our deﬁnitions accommodate stable
games.B. Passive systems induced by games
The deﬁnitions of the last section can be applied to the
input-output representation of a population game.
Theorem 3.3: Game subsystems induced by stable games
are X-anti-passive with storage function 0.
Proof: Since _  = DF(x)_ x; we have that
_ 0 _ x = _ x0(DF(x))0 _ x  0;
which implies
0   _ 0 _ x =  u0y:
We note here that DF(x) is not deﬁned for social states
x = 2 X. It follows that the only allowed inputs u = _ x are
those that that keep x in X. This is captured in the deﬁnition
of X-anti-passivity.
C. Passive Dynamics
We can similarly formulate an evolutionary dynamic _ x =
VF(x) as an input-output system.
_  = u
y = _ x = V(x)
where _ x is understood as the time-derivative of the social
state x and the deﬁnition of the system output. The social
state x appears in both the learning and game subsystems.
Abusing notation slightly, we use the subscripted variables
xG and xD to distinguish the two. It is easy to see that
the positive interconnection of the input-output systems
associated with the game and learning dynamics recovers
exactly the traditional differential equation as long as we
initialize xG(0) = xD(0) = x0; and (0) = F(x0); Indeed,
plugging in for the inputs u in the learning dynamics and
game equations gives
_  = DF(x)V(x)
_ x = V(x);
but since (0) = F(x0) this implies (t) = F(x(t)) for all t
so that we have simply _ x = VF(x); as required. However, we
have transformed an ordinary differential equation system of
order n to an interconnection of a system having order n with
a system having order 2n. We reiterate that for C1 games and
traditional learning dynamics this formulation is equivalent
to the traditional one under the natural initialization. We will
refer to the procedure just utilized as the natural dimensional
reduction.
We seek passive (i.e. Rn  X-passive) dynamics that
produce outputs _ x 2 UX(x0). We do not need to restrict
the inputs (_ ) to the dynamics in any way. The restriction
_ x 2 UX(x0) is needed to ensure that interconnection with
the game is meaningful, i.e. that we do not produce outputs
that, when input to the game subsystem, produce motion out
of X. We consider dynamics speciﬁed by revision protocols
p : Rn
p
 Xp ! R
n
pn
p
+ ;
so that
_ x
p
i =
X
j2Sp
x
p
j
p
ji(p;xp)   x
p
i
X
j2Sp

p
ij(p;xp):
Thus we can regard 
p
ij(p;xp) as the switch rate from
strategy i 2 Sp to strategy j 2 Sp.
Our ﬁrst example is the excess payoff target (EPT) dy-
namics. EPT dynamics have revision protocols of the form

p
ij(p;xp) = 
p
j (^ p);
where
^ p = p  
1
mp

(xp)0p

 1;
is the vector of excess payoffs. In this case the dynamics take
the simpler form
_ xp = mpp(^ p)  

10p(^ p)

 xp:
The EPT dynamics include best response1, logit, and Brown-
von Neumann-Nash dynamics. Clearly EPT dynamics always
guarantee _ x 2 UX(x0). We say that p is separable if 
p
i (^ p)
is independent of ^ 
p
 i, and acute if
p(^ p)0^ p > 0 whenever ^ p 2 Rnp   R
np
  :
We assume that p is Lipschitz continuous. The prototype of
this subset of the EPT dynamics is the Brown-von Neumann-
Nash dynamic, with 
p
i (^ 
p
i ) = [^ 
p
i ]+.
In the theorem that follows, we treat EPT dynamics as
input-output systems from _  to _ x, as explained above. The
proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.1 in [1].
Theorem 3.4: Seperable, acute EPT dynamics are strictly
Rn  X-passive with storage function
LEPT(x;) =
X
p2P
mp X
i2Sp
Z ^ 
p
i
0

p
i (s)ds:
The next section combines the results of the previous
two sections to recover the known convergence properties
of separable, acute EPT dynamics in stable games.
D. Interconnections
In order to realize traditional games/dynamics we restrict
ourselves to initializations that assign the same strategy
distributions to both the game and dynamics subsystems.
The payoffs, residing only in the dynamics subsystem, are
initialized so as to match the initial strategy distribution.
Formally, we consider initializations from the invariant set
MG;D = f(xG;;xD) : xG = xD 2 X; = F(x)g:
We trivially have 0 2 UMG;D(v) for all v 2 MG;D.
Combining the storage functions of stable games and
separable, acute EPT dynamics restricted to the proposed
invariant set and applying the natural dimensional reduction
gives zero level set for the combined storage function
(LEPT + 0) 1(0) \ MG;D = NE(F);
1Strictly speaking, best response dynamics are speciﬁed by a differential
inclusion, we do not discuss these here.corresponding to precisely the set of Nash equilibria of the
stable game. Theorems 3.1 - 3.4 provide an alternative proof
of the following known result, reworded below.
Theorem 3.5: [1] The positive-feedback interconnection
of a C1 stable game F and separable, acute EPT dynamics
admits the globally asymptotically stable set NE(F).
The advantage of the present formulation is that the
passivity inequality gives a sufﬁcient condition for con-
verge to equilibrium in stable games. In particular we see
that positive correlation need not be satisﬁed. Instead, we
check the correlation between the inner product of the time
derivative terms _ x and _ . Indeed it had already been shown
that positive correlation in an excess payoff dynamic not
satsifying integrability could lead to cycling in some stable
games [1]. In addition, the perturbed best response dynamics,
a class of dynamics not satisfying positive correlation, do
achieve global convergence in stable games [11]. Passivity
of perturbed best response dynamics, as well as a third
family of dynamics known as pairwise comparison dynamics
[20] can be demonstrated, but we do not do so here in
the interest of brevity. Next, We offer a decision theoretic
interpretation of the passivity inequality for the learning
subsystem. We borrow from the game theoretic interpretation
of stable games.
E. Interpreting the passivity inequality
Inspection of L
 1
EPT(0) reveals the basic action of the
EPT dynamics. In essence, EPT dynamics act as a greedy
optimizer. If no exogenous input is supplied (i.e. _  = 0),
then EPT dynamics will eventually ensure that only strategies
enjoying maximum payoff among their population will be
utilized. The passivity of EPT dynamics did not make any
assumptions on _ . In particular, _  need not be generated from
interconnection with a game. We will exploit this property
later by generalizing the game subsystem.
The passivity inequality for the EPT dynamics can be
given an interpretation that borrows from the interpretation
proposed for stable games. At L
 1
EPT(0), all populations
are content. We can thus think of LEPT as a metric of
discontent, although obviously it is not a true metric. The
passivity inequality says that the growth rate of agents’ dis-
content is always less than the instantaneous self-enforcing
externalities, _ x0 _ . These are the negative of self-defeating
externalities. This guarantee is independent of the procedure
generating _ . If the source of _  is interconnection with a
stable game, then instantaneous self-enforcing externalities
are zero and so our metric of discontent does not grow at
all!
The next section suggests some new learning dynamics
whose analysis is aided by our deﬁnitions.
IV. DYNAMIC LEARNING
In this section we consider learning dynamics that are
less myopic than traditional learning dynamics like EPT.
In particular, we examine the consequences of players’
utilizing either smoothed versions of the payoffs, or payoffs
augmented with an additive term that approximates the
time-derivative of the payoffs. Each of these modiﬁcations
captures the application of some form of forecasting heuristic
to the payoffs. With obvious caveats, we propose that these
learning dynamics approximate the way human cognition
attempts to extract regularities from data. In each case we
show that for games having afﬁne payoffs F(x) = Ax + b,
with A negative deﬁnite, neither anticipation or smoothing
have any consequences for global stability of passive learning
dynamics. The prototype for this class of games is congestion
games with afﬁne, strictly increasing costs and non-singular
utilization matrices.
A potential source of confusion is that we will be analyz-
ing the properties of subsystems we had previously identiﬁed
with the “game”. This is for mathematical convenience. The
dynamic learning rules are arrived at by applying a standard
learning dynamic (e.g. EPT) to modiﬁed payoffs ~ . Our
approach is to derive passivity results for modiﬁed “game”
subsystems that map action trajectories to modiﬁed payoff
trajectories. Interconnection with a passive learning dynamic
then implies convergence results. Thus the problem of ﬁnding
a class of games for which dynamic learning rules are well
behaved can be cast as the problem of ﬁnding games that
induce modiﬁed subsystems that are passive.
A. Smoothed learning
Suppose that F(x) = Ax+b, then we deﬁne the smoothed
learning subsystem induced by F as
_  = Au
y = _ ~  = (   ~ ):
The term _ x = u is no longer needed because DF(x) = A is
now independent of x. The operational payoffs ~  track the
usual payoffs , reﬂecting a state of affairs in which players
utilize smoothed versions of a nominal payoff stream. Given
a nominal payoff stream (t);t  0, the smoothed payoffs
are given by
~ i(t) = e t~ (0) +
Z t
0
e(s t)(s)ds: (3)
The operational payoff ~  is an exponentially weighted mov-
ing average of  with smoothing factor  > 0. These sort
of moving averages are naive yet popular heuristics used to
smooth out short term ﬂuctuations in order to isolate longer
term trends. Alternatively, smoothing may be unavoidable
when the players can only process information subject to
bandwidth limitations.
For games with A < 0 we ﬁnd that this form of payoff
smoothing admits passive systems.
Theorem 4.1: Let F(x) = Ax+b with A negative deﬁnite.
Then the smoothed learning subsystem induced by F is
strictly R2n-anti-passive with storage function
Lsl(; ~ ) =  

2
(   ~ )0A 1(   ~ );
having zero level set f(; ~ ) 2 R2n :  = ~ g.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4.1 is that any learn-
ing dynamic obtained from an admissible passive dynamicwith smooth measurement of payoffs has a stable equilib-
rium. Indeed, for the standard dynamics we have studied
global asymptotic stability of the applicable equilibrium set
is guaranteed.
Theorem 4.2: Let F = Ax + b with A < 0 and consider
the interconnection of the smoothed learning subsystem
induced by F and either separable, acute EPT dynamics or
impartial paiwise comparison dynamics. Then initializations
from the invariant set
MG;D = f(G; ~ G;D;xD) : G = F(xD);D = ~ Gg;
admit, using the natural dimensional reduction, the globally
asymptotically stable set NE(F).
An analogous result can be developed for other passive dy-
namics such as perturbed best response dynamics. To avoid
redundancy, we will avoid providing any more arguments of
this form. Instead we will stop at demonstrating passivity
of the subsystems we study, with the understanding that
stability results can then be easily veriﬁed. We next consider
anticipatory learning.
B. Anticipatory learning
Consider the following dynamic system, induced by an
afﬁne game F(x) = Ax + b.
_  = Au
_  = (   )
y = _ ~  = _  +  _ _  = A(1 + )u   2(   ):
We call this the anticipatory learning subsystem induced by
F. The intention is that players respond to an augmented
payoff ~  =  + !, where ! is an estimate of _  and  > 0
is the relative weight given to !. In the system above, the
quantity _  provides the estimate of _  via an approximate
differentiator. The ﬁdelity of the approximation is controlled
by  > 0, with larger values providing better estimates.
The concept of anticipatory learning was introduced in
[21], and is inspired by classical methods in automatic
control as well as the psychological tendency to extrapolate
from past trends. In [21], players are able to observe their
opponents’ strategies and then use anticipatory learning to
estimate their opponents’ future strategy. The players then
respond according to either ﬁctitious play or gradient play.
Here, we do not presume that players can observe their
opponents’ actions. The players use anticipatory learning to
produce estimates of future payoffs. We study the stability
properties of the overall system obtained when players re-
spond to the augmented payoffs using passive dynamics.
For afﬁne games with A negative deﬁnite, we ﬁnd that
anticipatory learning has no consequences for passive dy-
namics.
Theorem 4.3: Let F(x) = Ax+b with A negative deﬁnite.
Then the anticipatory learning subsystem induced by F is
strictly R2n-anti-passive with storage function
Lal(;) =  
23
4 + 2
(   )0A 1(   );
having zero level set f(;) 2 R2n :  = g.
The storage function Lal is valid for any ; > 0, so that
passivity is guaranteed regardless of the weight given to the
approximate derivative or the ﬁdelity of the approximation.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One issue in particular remains open— the status of
the replicator dynamics. The Lyapunov function typically
employed for replicator dynamics in stable games is the
KL divergence between the current social state and the
social state at equilibrium. Our framework does not allow
the storage function of the learning subsystem to exploit
properties of an underlying game structure.
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